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This paper explores the question of Leibniz’s contribution to the rise of modern “science”.1 
To be sure, it is now generally agreed that the modern category of “science” did not exist in 
the early modern period. At the same time, this period witnessed a very important stage in the 
process from which modern science eventually emerged. I will argue that Leibniz made a 
distinctive contribution to the journey from natural philosophy to natural science, and to the 
modern distinction between science and philosophy, through the development of a conception 
of physics as an autonomous enterprise. 
The terminology here is notoriously slippery, and some preliminary clarifications are 
therefore in order. When early modern authors use the word scientia, the closest translation is 
normally “knowledge” rather than “science”. At the centre of Leibniz’s scientific ambitions is 
a project – the scientia generalis – which looks prima facie very different from what we 
would nowadays call “science”. If these authors ever drew a distinction between philosophia 
and scientia, it would look very different from what is now commonly meant by the 
distinction between philosophy and science. 
Similar considerations apply to the distinction between physics (intended here 
primarily as the study of the motion of bodies under the action of forces) and metaphysics. 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the Suppes Center for the History and Philosophy of Science in Stanford, at a 
seminar in the Philosophy department of King’s College London, and at the conference in Lampeter from which 
the present volume originates. I would like to thank participants in the Stanford workshop, the King’s seminar, 
and the Lampeter conference (including Richard Arthur, Martha Bolton, Bill Brewer, Vincenzo De Risi, Stefano 
Di Bella, Paula Findlen, Michael Friedman, Daniel Garber, Sacha Golob, Eleanor Knox, Paul Lodge, Miguel 
Palomo, David Papineau, Pauline Phemister, Sherrilyn Roush, Justin Smith, Lloyd Strickland, Tzuchien Tho, 
and Erik Vynckier) for their questions and comments. Many thanks also to Domenico Bertoloni Meli and 
Gaston Robert for helpful feedback, to Andrew Janiak for sharing with me a forthcoming paper on Newton’s 
General Scholium, and, especially, to Howard Hotson for his insightful reading of two draft versions. When not 
otherwise stated, translations are my own. 
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Physics and metaphysics were two distinct parts of Aristotelian theoretical knowledge but the 
way in which they were distinguished by Aristotle and his followers is not the way in which 
we would now see them as two distinct enterprises -- mainly because modern physics is no 
longer what Aristotle’s called “physics”, and his Latin followers called philosophia 
naturalis.2 Moreover, to complicate matters further, authors who are now widely regarded as 
among the chief architects of modern science referred to their own endeavour as “natural 
philosophy” and / or to themselves as “philosophers” or “natural philosophers”: it suffices to 
recall Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) or Galileo’s request to 
be named not only “Matematico” (mathematician) but also “Filosofo” (philosopher).3 
My discussion will be aimed at uncovering the new enterprise, and the new 
distinctions which were taking shape in the early modern period under the banner of the old 
terminology. Although Galileo and Newton still employed Aristotelian language, what they 
were doing was something significantly new – their philosophia naturalis was a new type of 
“physics” crucially different from Aristotelian physics in its experimental method and 
mathematical explanation of natural phenomena on the basis of quantifiable features of the 
natural world. 
Likewise, I will argue that Leibniz begins to theorize a distinction between physics 
and metaphysics that tracks our modern distinction between the autonomous activity of 
science in its modern meaning, and the undertaking of philosophy. I will try to show that, for 
Leibniz, physics proper is the study of natural phenomena in mathematical and mechanical 
terms without recourse for its explanations to metaphysical notions. This autonomy, however, 
does not imply for Leibniz that physics can say on its own all that there is to be said about the 
natural world. Quite the opposite. Leibniz inherits from the Aristotelian tradition the view 
                                                 
2 Heilbron, Elements of Early Modern Physics, esp. pp. 1-11, notes that “at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century “physics” signified a qualitative, bookish science of natural bodies in general. It was at once wider and 
narrower than the subject that now has its name: wider in its coverage which included organic and psychological 
as well as inorganic phenomena; and narrower in its methods, which recommended neither mathematics nor 
experiment.” (p. 1) Any quantified aspects fell under “mixed” or “applied” mathematics rather than physics, 
including fields such as hydraulics, fortification, navigation and surveying, as well as astronomy and optics. 
3 Galileo to Belisario Vinta, 7 May 1610; Opere, vol. 10, p. 353: “Finally, as regards the description and 
motivation of my service, I would wish Your Highness to add the title of Philosopher to the title of 
Mathematician, since I studied philosophy for more years than the months I studied pure mathematics.” 
Attention to this passage is drawn by Vanni Rovighi, Storia della Filosofia Moderna, p. 48, to which my 
discussion is indebted. 
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that physics needs metaphysical roots or a metaphysical grounding. For Leibniz, what is 
ultimately real is reached by metaphysics, not by physics. 
This is, however, a metaphysical rather than a physical claim as much in Leibniz’s 
time as it is in our time. Whether physics studies what is ultimately real, or whether a meta-
physical level of explanation is needed, is not a question proper to a physics textbook. 
Students interested in this question will need to turn instead to a philosophy course. This 
reflects, in my view, Leibniz’s chief insight: the new mathematical physics is an autonomous 
activity which offers its own kind of explanations but does not exhaust what can (and should) 
be said about the natural world. There is in fact a further level of explanation, based on a 
different kind of investigation that belongs to a different sphere. This position does not make 
Leibniz someone who is pursuing a type of inquiry which is nowadays extinct,4 since quite a 
few twenty-first-century metaphysicians continue to think that modern physics does not 
exhaust all that can be said about reality. On the contrary, I will argue that Leibniz’s position 
marks a milestone toward a modern understanding of the distinction between philosophy and 
science. 
 
The backdrop: the reform and advancement of all the sciences 
 
Throughout his life, Leibniz pursued the reform and advancement of all the sciences, to be 
undertaken as a collaborative venture supported by an enlightened ruler.5 He conceived of 
this endeavour as the progressive establishment of a systematic, demonstrative encyclopaedia 
arising from the development of a scientia generalis (general science). His explanation of 
what the scientia generalis was supposed to be, and what it was supposed to accomplish, 
varies sometimes quite significantly from text to text. Moreover, the explicit mentions of this 
project decline dramatically after 1688.6 Notwithstanding these caveats, it is still possible to 
                                                 
4 For a different view, see Garber’s Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, p. 383. Garber suggests that “what 
Leibniz is doing is a kind of enterprise that we don’t do today, either in physics or in philosophy: it is (natural) 
philosophy as Leibniz and his contemporaries understood the enterprise.” 
5 In Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography, I have tried to show that many of Leibniz’s extraordinarily rich but 
apparently miscellaneous endeavours were aspects of a single master project of reform and advancement of all 
the sciences. 
6 In “The Scientia Generalis and the Encyclopaedia,” Arnaud Pelletier stresses that Leibniz speaks in very 
different ways of the scientia generalis. Moreover, he notes that after 1688 there is only one unfinished draft 
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identify some broad features of an enterprise which remains constant throughout Leibniz’s 
life as an overarching project he never abandons. This is a project deeply indebted to 
Renaissance encyclopaedic and pansophic traditions championed by thinkers such as J. H. 
Alsted (1588–1638), J. H. Bisterfeld (c. 1605-1655), J. A. Comenius (1592-1670), as well as 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626). In line with the pansophic aspirations of these authors, the 
scientia generalis was intended by Leibniz as the “science” or knowledge embracing the 
principles, elements, or foundations of all the sciences, out of which the whole encyclopaedia 
could have been expounded in a systematic way. 
Accordingly, in several proposals sketched by Leibniz for a preliminary work 
containing the “Introduction to the Secret Encyclopaedia” or the “Initia et Specimena” 
(“Beginnings and Examples”) of the scientia generalis proper, the scientia generalis is 
defined in a Baconian manner as pertaining to “the instauration and advancement of the 
sciences for the common happiness” (“de instauratione et augmentis scientiarum ad publicam 
felicitatem”).7 Once again in line with pansophic and Baconian programmes of reform and 
development of knowledge, two key features of Leibniz’s scientia generalis and 
encyclopaedic project are in evidence: on the one hand, the conviction of the unity of 
knowledge, grounding in turn a systematic conception of the encyclopaedia; on the other 
hand, its praxis-oriented aim of advancing the sciences for the promotion of human 
happiness. As Leibniz writes in a text of 1678-9: 
 
it is in the interest of the happiness of humankind that there be brought together a 
certain encyclopaedia or orderly collection of truths, sufficient (as far as possible) for 
                                                 
explicitly focused on the scientia generalis (Aurora seu Initia Scientiae Generalis, mid-1690s, LH IV, 7a, f. 11-
12; partly published in GP VII, 54-56). 
7 See especially Introductio ad Encyclopaediam arcanam; Sive Initia et Specimina Scientiae Generalis, de 
Instauratione et augmentis scientiarum, deque perficienda mente, et rerum inventionibus, ad publicam 
felicitatem, c. summer 1683–beginning of 1685 (A VI, 4, N. 126). Cf. also A VI, 4, N. 85–86, N. 110, N. 115, 
N. 158–159. Francis Bacon’s Instauratio Magna envisaged the restoration of man’s dominion over nature, lost 
after the original Fall, through the development of a new empirical and experimental approach to gaining 
knowledge of nature which could be applied to practical use. His Novum Organum, published in 1620 as the 
second part of this grand plan, was supposed to provide this project with a new, inductive scientific method, 
intended to supersede the Aristotelian Organum. In 1623, Bacon published De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiarum, an expanded Latin version of his earlier The Proficience and Advancement of Learning (1605), 
which placed this reform of natural philosophy within a comprehensive reorganization of the entire edifice of 
knowledge. 
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the deduction of all useful things. And this will be like a public treasury to which could 
be added all remarkable [subsequent] discoveries and observations. But since [this 
Encyclopaedia] will be of the most massive bulk, especially regarding matters of civil 
and natural history, in the meantime a certain Scientia Generalis is needed containing 
the first principles of reason and experience[.]8  
 
Leibniz was fully aware that such an all-embracing undertaking ought to be a collaborative 
enterprise under the patronage of an enlightened ruler. Hence his tireless efforts toward the 
establishment of Academies of Sciences where collaborative work was to be carried out, and 
his recurrent search for a patron prepared to finance a scientific programme geared at pooling 
all systematically developed knowledge into a “public treasury”. In his earliest outline of this 
overarching plan -- the Demonstrationum Catholicarum Conspectus of 1668-9 – Leibniz 
envisaged first of all the establishment of the “elements of philosophy”, namely the first 
principles of metaphysics (de Ente), of logic (de Mente), of mathematics (de Spatio), of 
physics (de Corpore), and of ethics and politics or “practical philosophy” (de Civitate).9 
These principles were to constitute the prolegomena to further demonstrations including the 
immortality of the soul and the existence of God. 
In a detailed Memoir for Enlightened Persons, penned in the mid-1690s and echoing 
earlier thoughts, he stressed the ultimately practical aim of all these inquiries, namely the 
promotion of the common good and, thereby, the fostering of human happiness. “To 
contribute truly to the happiness of men,” Leibniz claimed, “one must enlighten their 
understanding; one must fortify their will in the exercise of virtues, that is, the habit of acting 
according to reason; and one must, finally, try to remove the obstacles which prevent them 
from finding truth and following true goods.”10 The enlightenment of the understanding was 
to be achieved, in Leibniz’s view, through the study of logic, that is, “the method of judging 
and inventing”. “In addition,” he continued, “one must cause to be recorded, as if in a general 
inventory, the truths of consequence which have already been discovered, and which are to be 
found not only in books, but also among men of all sorts of professions. And one must, 
finally, take measures suited to insure the carrying out of research and experimentation in 
order to advance toward the future as much as possible.” In turn, “to improve men’s will”, it 
                                                 
8 Studia ad Felicitatem Dirigenda; A VI, 4, 137–8. 
9 A VI, 1, 494 / LGR 22. 
10 PW 105. 
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was necessary not only to “put forward good precepts” but also to reform education. Last but 
not least, the promotion of human beings’ happiness demanded that also “the impediments 
which … come from our body” be removed, namely, “one must seek the means of preserving 
their health, and giving them the conveniences of life”. Thus, Leibniz concluded, “one must 
inquire into the nature of bodies in the universe, as much as to recognize therein the 
marvellous traces of divine wisdom, as to notice the respects in which they can be useful to 
our preservation and even to our greater perfection.”11  
 In brief, Leibniz’s work in physics and his inquiries into the natural world were 
integral parts of an encyclopaedic, systematic plan of development of all the sciences 
grounded in the unity of knowledge and ultimately aimed at human happiness. There is no 
better way to celebrate the Glory of God in His creation, Leibniz thought, than by advancing 
all the sciences and thereby improve the human condition.12 
 
Metaphysics and physics -- from natural philosophy to natural science 
 
Against this backdrop of Leibniz’s encyclopaedic scientific ambitions, and their indebtedness 
to pansophic traditions which may seem far removed from modern scientific approaches, we 
can now tackle the question of how Leibniz contributed to the rise of modern “science”, 
broadly understood. Leibniz is, of course, traditionally numbered among the architects of the 
seventeenth-century “scientific revolution” from which modern science eventually emerged. 
His contributions are diverse and could be considered from a variety of angles, not least his 
invention of the calculus. I will focus, however, on what seems to me his distinctive 
contribution to the development of the concept of modern science itself as an undertaking 
distinct from philosophy. In doing so, I will revisit some aspects of one of the most hotly 
debated issues in recent literature: namely, the relationship between metaphysics and physics 
in his thought.  
 
The distinction between metaphysical and physical explanations 
 
In a very early text, the Confessio naturae contra Atheistas of 1668-69, Leibniz writes: 
 
                                                 
11 WP 106-7. 
12 For a detailed discussion of this point see Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography. 
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through the admirable improvement of mathematics and the approaches which 
chemistry and anatomy have opened into the nature of things, it has become apparent 
that mechanical explanations – reasons from the figure and motion of bodies, as it were 
– can be given for most of the things which the ancients referred only to the Creator or 
to some kind (I know not what) of incorporeal forms.  The result was that truly capable 
men for the first time began to try to save or to explain natural phenomena, or those 
which appear in bodies, without assuming God or taking him into their reasoning.  
Then, after their attempt had met with some little success, though before they arrived at 
foundations and principles, they proclaimed, as if rejoicing prematurely at their 
security, that they could find neither God not the immortality of the soul by natural 
reason … It seemed to me unworthy for our mind to be blinded in this matter by its 
own light, that is, by philosophy.  I began therefore myself to undertake an 
investigation … Setting aside all prejudices, therefore, and suspending the credit of 
Scripture and history, I set my mind to the anatomy of bodies, to see whether the 
sensory appearance of bodies can be explained without assuming an incorporeal cause.  
At the beginning I readily admitted that we must agree with those contemporary 
philosophers who have revived Democritus and Epicurus and whom Robert Boyle aptly 
calls corpuscular philosophers, such as Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, 
and Digby, that in explaining corporeal phenomena, we must not unnecessarily resort to 
God or to any other incorporeal thing, form, or quality … but that so far as can be done, 
everything should be derived from the nature of body and its primary qualities – 
magnitude, figure, and motion.  But what if I should demonstrate that the origin of 
these very primary qualities themselves cannot be found in the essence of body? Then 
indeed, I hope, these naturalists will admit that body is not self-sufficient and cannot 
subsist without an incorporeal principle.13 
 
I regard this as a fundamental text in which we can find one of the first (and indeed the first I 
am aware of) incipient theorization of a distinction between “science” (taken in a modern 
sense) and philosophy. The young Leibniz presents here metaphysics and the new 
quantitative, mechanical physics as two different kinds of explanation. On the one hand, he 
fully embraces the new mathematically based science, or (as it was still called) “philosophy 
of nature”, for the explanation of natural phenomena. On the other hand, he maintains that the 
                                                 
13 A VI, 1, 489 / PPL 109-110. 
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new mechanical physics does not answer more fundamental questions about the ultimate 
principles of reality. A further level of explanation is needed in order to account properly for 
the features of the physical world of which we have experience. According to him, in 
physical notions there are implicit principles which cannot be reduced to extension and 
motion. There must be in bodies a principle of unity and activity. The metaphysical notions 
expressing such a principle, however, should not enter into the explanations of physics 
proper, since physics proper is only concerned with the mathematical treatment of natural 
phenomena which can and should be explained mechanically. 
It seems to me that this position about the relationship between physics and 
metaphysics remains constant throughout Leibniz’s ensuing intellectual career. The 
interpretation that I am proposing differs therefore in some significant respects from the 
reading of Leibniz’s development outlined by Daniel Garber in his milestone monograph 
Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (2009).14 According to Garber, “in the late 1670’s, in 1678 
or 1679, Leibniz seems to make a decisive break with his past views, and starts what is 
substantially a new direction. A number of commentators characterize the change as a revival 
of substantial forms”.15 Garber notes, however, that “matters are more complex than this 
simple account would suggest. In a way, substantial forms go back at least a decade to the 
end of the 1660s [that is, I note, the time of the Confessio Naturae]; there is a sense in which 
he never abandon them.” “Even so,” Garber continues,  
 
there is a radical change in Leibniz’s thought at just that moment. In 1678 or 1679, 
Leibniz seems to extend substantial forms from theology to physics: substantial forms 
are important now for body itself, for the concept of body that we need to understand 
the physical world. He continues to believe, as he had for some time and as he will for 
the rest of his career, that everything must be explained mechanically, through size, 
shape and motion. But starting in 1678-1679, Leibniz begins to articulate a new 
                                                 
14 At the same time, I would like to stress that there is much in Garber’s monograph with which I strongly agree, 
notably the virtues of a developmental approach to Leibniz’s philosophical thought, showing (amongst other 
things) that Leibniz was deeply interested in the world of which we have experience. As Garber argues, far from 
being a dogmatic thinker unconcerned with the physical world, Leibniz placed the project of explaining this 
very world of experience at the heart of his philosophical explorations from the very beginning. It is in order to 
reach a satisfactory explanation of this world of experience that Leibniz thinks and re-thinks his position 
throughout his life. 
15 Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, p. 48. 
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doctrine: even though everything is explicable mechanically, the foundations of the 
mechanical philosophy require us to appeal to soul or form.16  
 
There are indeed very important, and even transformative, developments in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics and physics between the Confessio Naturae of 1668-9 and his writings of 1678-
1679. In a breakthrough paper of the summer 1676, De Arcanis Motus et Mechanica ad 
puram Geometriam reducenda, Leibniz introduced the fundamental principle of equivalence 
between full cause and entire effect.17 In January 1678, in an unpublished paper on the laws 
of motion and on the collision of bodies (De corporum concursu), Leibniz focused on the 
notion of force, quantifying it for the first time as the product of mass (m) and the square of 
speed (v2).18 In a Conspectus Libelli Elementorum Physicae, written between the summer 
1678 and the winter 1678/79, he noted that it is not the quantity of motion (mass times speed 
or mv) which is conserved in the universe, as Descartes maintained, but the quantity of force 
(mass times the square of speed or mv2),19 overturning one of the core principles of Cartesian 
physics, namely the principle of the conservation of motion.20 Last but not least, in a key 
programmatic letter of the autumn 1679 to his new patron, the Duke of Hanover, Johann 
Friedrich, Leibniz boldly endorsed substantial forms in the context of a relaunch of his 
encyclopaedic plan of the Demonstrationes Catholicae.21 
 As Garber acknowledges, however, substantial forms had never been totally rejected 
by Leibniz, provided they were employed in an appropriate metaphysical context, as opposed 
to being invoked in physical explanations of natural phenomena. This is one of the key points 
made in the Confessio Naturae. Moreover, around 1668, Leibniz defined “substantial form” 
in De Transsubstantiatione as the principle of action required for a being to qualify as a 
substance and corresponding to what Aristotle called “nature.”22 In a text composed between 
1673 and 1675 he equated the principle of action or conatus which is internal to bodies and 
                                                 
16 Garber, Body, Substance, Monad, pp. 48-49; the second emphasis is mine. 
17 Edited by Hess in Leibniz à Paris (1672–1676), pp. 202–205 (see p. 203). 
18 Published in Fichant, G. W. Leibniz. La Réforme de la dynamique. 
19 A VI, 4, 1989. 
20 This result was famously announced in the Acta Eruditorum of March 1686 with the publication of Leibniz’s 
Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii et aliorum circa legem naturae (A VI, 4, N. 369). 
21 See A II,1, N. 213 and A I, 2, N. 187 (these are two versions of the same letter; a third brief version is 
published in A I, 2, N. 186). English translations in PPL 259-62 and LGR 47-51. 
22 A VI, 1, 511 / LGR 38. 
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constitutes their principle of “substantiality” with what “the scholastics . . . called substantial 
form,” using therefore the notion of substantial form not only in a theological context but also 
in his philosophy of bodies.23 
It should certainly be noted that the philosophy of bodies emerging around 1670-72 is 
different in at least one crucial respect from the philosophy of bodies underpinning the 
Confessio Naturae and other texts of 1668–9. In these earlier texts, in the case of non-rational 
beings, Leibniz interpreted the “incorporeal principle” or “principle of activity” needed by 
bodies in terms of a transcendent Mind (that is, God) rather than as a principle of action 
immanent in bodies. The move away from the pantheistic dangers of such a view toward a 
metaphysics fully committed to an intrinsic principle of action in bodies is undoubtedly a 
momentous one. 
However, these shifting metaphysical views do not imply an extension of “substantial 
forms from theology to physics”. As regards the conception of the relationship between 
physics and metaphysics, it seems to me that Leibniz remains committed to the same position 
as the Confessio Naturae: metaphysical principles – whether conceived as substantial forms 
or as some other incorporeal principle – ought not to enter into physical explanations of 
natural phenomena. Although at the time of the Confessio Naturae he had not yet developed 
the tools for thinking in a satisfactory way about the incorporeal principle required by bodies, 
he had already matured a view on the relationship between physics and metaphysics which 
later breakthroughs in both fields did not change. 
  In sum, Leibniz’s great insight is twofold. First of all, the mathematical and 
mechanical explanation of natural phenomena is an autonomous enterprise. In such 
explanations, there is no place for substantial forms. Secondly, our understanding of bodies, 
or, more precisely, our understanding of their nature, is not exhausted by this kind of inquiry. 
Quite the opposite. In order to achieve a deeper understanding of the physical world, it is 
necessary to reach its metaphysical foundations and appeal to metaphysical principles. The 
crucial point is, however, that these are meta-physical principles. They provide the 
metaphysical grounding of physics, the philosophical foundations of mechanism, as opposed 
to being the object of physics proper or being extended to physics itself. 
 
                                                 
23 De vera methodo philosophiae et theologiae ac de natura corporis (A VI, 3, 158; English translation in LS 
64). For a discussion of texts before 1679 in which Leibniz employs the notion of substantial forms, see Fichant, 
“Mécanisme et métaphysique,” pp. 168, 172-8. 
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Ascribing the genesis of this important distinction to Leibniz does not depend on the slender 
thread of an isolated early text. On the contrary: a long strand of similar passages, penned 
throughout the rest of his life, are quite explicit in drawing this distinction, as well as in 
agreeing with the outlook on this issue already presented in the Confessio Naturae. In 
paragraph 10 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), Leibniz stresses that the consideration 
of substantial forms “serves no purpose in the details of physics” and that “they ought not to 
be used to explain particular phenomena”. Nevertheless, “this inadequate understanding and 
abuse of the forms ought not to make us reject something whose knowledge is so necessary in 
metaphysics”, although “a physicist can give an explanation of his experiments, making use, 
now of simpler experiences already past, now of geometric and mechanical demonstrations, 
without needing the general considerations which belong to another sphere.”24 Writing to 
Antoine Arnauld on 14 July 1686, Leibniz reiterates that he “subscribe[s] fully to the 
corpuscular theory in the explanation of particular phenomena; in this sphere it is of no value 
to speak of forms or qualities. Nature must always be explained mathematically and 
mechanically, provided it is remembered that the very principles or laws of mechanism or of 
force do not depend on mathematical extension alone, but on certain metaphysical reasons.”25 
 The same position can be found in 1695, in the New System of the Nature and the 
Communication of Substances, where Leibniz writes: 
 
I realized that the consideration of mere extended mass is insufficient … So it was 
necessary to recall and, as it were, to rehabilitate substantial forms, which are so much 
decried these days – but in a way which would make them intelligible, and which 
would separate the use which should be made of them from their previous misuse. … 
just as the soul ought not to be used to explain in detail the workings of an animal’s 
body, I decided that similarly these forms must not be used to solve particular problems 
of nature, although they are necessary for grounding true general principles. Aristotle 
calls them first entelechies. I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, primitive forces.26 
 
In On Body and Force and the Laws of Motion of 1702, Leibniz notes that “although we say 
that everything in nature is to be explained mechanically,” the principles of mechanism 
                                                 
24 PPL 308-309. 
25 PW 63. 
26 WF 11-12.  
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themselves derive “from a metaphysical source, namely, from the equality of cause and effect 
and from other laws of this kind, which are essential to entelechies.”27 On 10 January 1714, 
writing to Nicolas Rémond, he recalls that when he looked “for the ultimate reasons of 
Mechanism,” he was “fully surprised to see that it was impossible to find them in 
Mathematics, and that it was necessary to return to Metaphysics.”28   
It should finally be stressed that, for Leibniz, the forces studied by physics are not 
primitive forces but the derivative forces grounded in the former. Primitive forces (identified 
in the passage above from the New System with substantial forms or first entelechies) are the 
object of metaphysics, not of physics. Accordingly, Leibniz denounces the misuse of 
substantial forms in Aristotelian physics, while vindicating them as metaphysical principles 
of explanation needed to ground the natural phenomena and the physical derivative forces of 
which we have experience. 
 
Objections 
 
There are, however, some fairly obvious objections to the interpretation that I am proposing, 
namely to the view that, for Leibniz, physics is concerned with the mathematical and 
mechanical description and explanation of phenomena, without extension of metaphysical 
entities such as substantial forms to physics proper. 
 
A first objection could appeal to Leibniz’s principle of equivalence between full cause and 
entire effect. There can be no doubt that, according to Leibniz, this principle (fully 
recognised, as we have seen, from 1676 onward)29 has fundamental consequences for 
physics. It follows from the equivalence between full cause and entire effect that force must 
                                                 
27 AG 254-255. 
28 “When I looked for the ultimate reasons of Mechanism and of the laws of movement themselves, I was fully 
surprised to see that it was impossible to find them in Mathematics, and that it was necessary to return to 
Metaphysics. This is what took me back to Entelechies, and from the material to the formal, and made me 
finally understand, after many corrections and advancements of my notions, that the Monads, or simple 
substances, are the only true substances, and material things are nothing more than phenomena, but well 
founded and well connected. This is that of which Plato, and even the later Academics, and also the Sceptics, 
have glimpsed something, but these Gentlemen, who came after Plato, did not made use of it as well as him.” 
(GP III, 606; a translation of this passage can also be found in PPL 655) 
29 See Fichant, “Mécanisme et métaphysique,” pp. 179–80. 
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be estimated from the quantity of the effect that it can produce, leading to Leibniz’s 
fundamental objection to Cartesian physics that it is not the quantity of motion (mass times 
speed or mv) which is conserved in the universe, but the quantity of force (mass times the 
square of speed or mv2).30 
 Leibniz, however, is quite explicit that the equivalence between full cause and entire 
effect is a metaphysical principle which grounds physical principles.31 That is, he quite 
explicitly acknowledges two different levels of explanation. I will come back in a moment to 
the issue of how these two levels are related. For now I would like to draw attention to the 
following passages in which this distinction seems to me clear:  
 
there is always a perfect equation between the full cause and the entire effect. This law 
not only says that the effects are proportional to the causes, but also that each entire 
effect is equivalent to its cause. And despite the fact that this axiom is indeed 
metaphysical, it is nevertheless among the most useful which can be employed in 
physics and provides the means to reduce forces to a geometrical calculation.32  
 
From this fundamental metaphysical principle and its consequence for physics – namely that 
force must be estimated by the quantity of the effect – Leibniz draws, in turn, an important 
metaphysical conclusion: 
 
I will add a remark of consequence for metaphysics. I have shown that force should not 
be estimated by the composition of speed and mass [mv], but by the future effect. 
Nevertheless it appears that force or power is something real from the present 
[moment], and [that] the future effect is not. Hence it follows that it will be necessary 
to admit in bodies something different from mass and speed, unless one wishes to deny 
to bodies all power of acting.33 
 
                                                 
30 See Conspectus Libelli Elementorum Physicae, c. summer 1678–winter 1678/79 (A VI, 4, 1989), mentioned 
above. LC 235: “Force or power … must be estimated from the quantity of the effect. But the power of the 
effect and of the cause are equal to each other . . . Here it is worth showing that the same quantity of motion 
cannot be conserved, but that on the other hand the same quantity of power is conserved.” 
31 See for instance the passage from On Body and Force and the Laws of Motion, cited above. 
32 Leibniz to Bayle, 9 January 1687; GP III, 45-6. 
33 Leibniz to Bayle, 9 January 1687; GP III, 48. 
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With regard to the relationship between physics and metaphysics, it seems to me that what 
Leibniz is saying here is the following. The metaphysical principle of the equivalence 
between full cause and entire effect demands that in physical calculations we use the quantity 
of force estimated by the future effect, with all sorts of fruitful consequences. It is in this 
sense that this principle is “employed in physics”. This raises, however, a metaphysical 
problem, that is, a problem which does not impact on the mathematical description of 
phenomena but has crucial import for our conception of the nature of bodies as requiring an 
intrinsic power of acting which is manifested in the quantifiable features of bodies that enter 
in our calculation -- mass and (the square of) speed -- but does not reduce to them. 
 
A second objection may point to Leibniz’s defence of the use of final causes in physics. In 
Body and Force and the Laws of Motion Leibniz writes: 
 
Whatever Descartes may have said, not only efficient causes, but also final causes, are 
to be treated in physics, just as a house would be badly explained if we were to describe 
only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.34 
 
In speaking of “arrangement of parts”, Leibniz is clearly referring to a mechanical 
explanation, as we would explain a watch showing what bit of the mechanism moves what 
and so on. On the other hand, providing merely an explanation of what bit moves what would 
not constitute a good explanation of the watch for anyone who has no idea of what such 
mechanism is for, what its purpose, “its use” is. 
 The passage continues as already cited above:  
 
although we say that everything in nature is to be explained mechanically, we must 
exempt the explanation of the laws of motion themselves, or the principles of 
mechanism, which should not be derived from things merely mathematical and subject 
to the imagination, but from a metaphysical source, namely, from the equality of cause 
and effect and from other laws of this kind, which are essential to entelechies.35  
 
                                                 
34 AG 254-255. 
35 AG 255. 
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This position is unpacked in other texts, such as the very interesting Tentamen anagogicum of 
1696, in which Leibniz declares that 
 
all natural phenomena could be explained mechanically if we understood them well 
enough, but the principles of mechanics themselves cannot be explained geometrically, 
since they depend on more sublime principles, which show the wisdom of the Author in 
the order and perfection of his work.36  
 
The text, however, continues: 
 
in corporeal nature itself, there are, so to speak, two kingdoms which penetrate one 
another without confusing themselves and hindering one another: the kingdom of 
power, according to which everything can be explained mechanically by efficient 
causes . . . ; and also the kingdom of wisdom, according to which everything can be 
explained, so to speak, architectonically by final causes[.]37 
 
It seems to me that Leibniz is pointing here again at two orders of explanation of the natural 
world which should not be “confused”. One is the order of explanation offered by physics 
proper, that is the mathematical and mechanical explanation of “natural phenomena” through 
efficient causes; the other is a metaphysical order of explanation through final causes,38 
which goes back to what the Confessio Naturae of 1668-9 called the “foundations and 
principles”, and the Tentamen anagogicum of 1696 calls “more sublime principles”, that is, 
metaphysical principles required ultimately to ground the “principles of mechanics 
themselves”. This position seems to me consistent with the distinction between physical and 
metaphysical explanations which we have encountered in the Confessio Naturae, the 
Discourse on Metaphysics, the letter to Arnaud of July 1686, the New System, the letter to 
Rémond of 1714, and, last but not least, On Body and Force itself. 
                                                 
36 GP VII, 272; trans. by Garber in Leibniz, 234 (an English trans. of this text is also available in PPL 478). 
37 GP VII, 273 (an English trans. of this text is also available in PPL 478-479). 
38 See also Monadology § 79 (PW 192): “Souls act according to the laws of final causes by appetitions, ends, 
and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes by motions. And the two kingdoms, of efficient 
and of final causes, are in harmony with one another.” 
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 There is, however, a further role played by final causes which is (as Garber notes) 
“useful in physics itself”. A consideration of final causes -- that is, I take it, a consideration of 
what certain natural phenomena are for, their uses, their purposes, their functions – “enable[s] 
us to discover things which are too complex for us to discover if we limit ourselves to the 
study of efficient causes.”39 For instance, it was indeed very useful to discover that the 
function of DNA is to encode instructions regulating the development of all living organisms 
even if we don’t know most or many of the details of how this works (e.g., we don’t know 
how exactly the extra genetic material present in trisomy causes certain syndromes). To use 
Leibniz’s own example, discoveries such as that of the magnetic needle would remain of 
great importance even if we were never to come to an adequate understanding of how the 
magnetic needle works.40 There is therefore a use for final causes in physics proper, but this 
use does seem consistent with a distinction between physics and metaphysics along the lines I 
have proposed. 
 
A further objection may come from the fact that early modern natural philosophy was much 
broader than modern physics.41 In its largest, etymological sense, “physics” extended to the 
study of all natural things.42 Notably, it included biology. In Leibniz, the notion of living 
organism is crucial not only for the scientific investigation of the natural world, but also for 
metaphysics.43 For instance, in an often quoted passage from a letter to De Volder of 20 June 
1703, Leibniz presents an ontological scheme according to which corporeal substance is 
conceived as an “Animal” “made One” by a monad dominating an “organic machine” 
constituted by an infinite aggregate of monads.44 In paragraph 64 of the Monadology, Leibniz 
                                                 
39 Garber, Leibniz, p. 235. 
40 Dutens V, 147-148: “in the natural world also the discovery of the magnetic needle is and will be a great 
thing, even if its workings remain forever unexplained to us.”  
41 On the scope of natural philosophy in the early modern period see Blair, “Natural philosophy.” 
42 Heilbron, Elements of Early Modern Physics, pp. 7-8 identifies the second edition of Hamberger’s Elementa 
Physices, Methodo Mathematica …Conscripta (Jena 1735) as the first important textbook which explicitly 
excluded the “whole theory of plants, animals and man” (see Preface). 
43 The study of early modern life sciences pioneered by Duchesneau (see Les modèles du vivant de Descartes à 
Leibniz) has been followed by other important contributions which have explored the significance of the notion 
of living organism for Leibniz. See especially Nunziante, Organismo come armonia; Duchesneau, Leibniz, le 
vivant et l’organisme; and Smith, Divine Machines. 
44 “I distinguish therefore (1) the primitive Entelechy or Soul, (2) Matter, i. e. primary matter, or primitive 
passive power, (3) the Monad completed by these two, (4) the Mass [Massa] or secondary matter, or organic 
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describes living things as divine machines or machines of nature which are “still machines in 
the least of their parts ad infinitum.”45 Important studies have stressed the role of the 
burgeoning early modern microscopy in providing inspiration for distinctive Leibnizian 
metaphysical theses,46 notably his view that “the least particle must be regarded as a world 
full of an infinity [une infinité] of creatures”;47 his claims that there is continuity in nature 
(“nature never makes leaps”),48 that “the nature of things is uniform”,49 and that the world is 
a plenum;50 and his thesis that apparently inanimate or inorganic bodies reduce to living 
bodies or organisms (“there is a world of created beings – living things, animals, entelechies, 
and souls – in the least part of matter”).51 In brief, one may wonder whether the distinction 
between metaphysics and science (intended in a modern way as distinct enterprises) breaks 
down, for Leibniz, in the case of life sciences. 
 I do not think this is the case. Although microscopy may well have inspired, or 
perhaps more precisely, confirmed some of his metaphysical views, Leibniz remains very 
clear that monads and the “World of substances” belong to an intelligible order, distinct from 
the phenomena of the senses studied by the microscopists.52 Monads are not the sort of 
entities which could be observed if a powerful enough microscope had been devised. Even at 
microscopic level, the organic bodies studied by life sciences are still extended, sensible 
entities which are regarded by Leibniz as well-founded phenomena rather than the 
metaphysical entities which are ultimately real. Assuming the monodological framework of 
the letter to De Volder or the passages from the Monadology quoted above, the relationship 
between the extended sensible bodies studied by life sciences, and the aggregates of monads 
from which they result, is analogous to the relationship between the derivative forces studied 
by physics and the primitive forces which are the object of metaphysics. 
                                                 
machine, for which countless subordinate Monads come together, (5) the Animal or corporeal substance, which 
is made One by the Monad dominating the Machine.” (LDV 264; trans. by Adams in Leibniz, p. 265). 
45 PW 189. 
46 See especially Wilson, The Invisible World and Becchi, Arlecchino e il Microscopio. 
47 A II 2, 713. An English translation is available at: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/foucher.htm 
48 NE 56. 
49 LDV 306-7. 
50 Monadology §§ 61-62. 
51 Monadology § 190, PW 190. 
52 Cf. NE 378: “When one considers further what belongs to the nature of these real unities, that is perception 
and its consequences, one is transported, so to speak, into another world, that is to say into the intelligible World 
of substances, whereas previously one was only among the phenomena of the senses.” 
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The hardest objection, however, comes perhaps precisely from Leibniz’s theory of derivative 
forces. How can Leibniz maintain a distinction between metaphysics and physics if he 
conceives of derivative forces (that is, the forces studied by physics) as modifications of 
primitive forces (that is, intra-monadic forces, which undoubtedly belong to metaphysics)?53 
Insofar as derivative forces are modifications of primitive forces, one may object that they 
are, really, the same forces albeit “modified”. 
 
Reply: a one-world view 
 
In order to reply to this objection, and more generally, to the points raised above about the 
principle of the equivalence between full cause and entire effect, final causes, and the 
relationship between life sciences and metaphysics, the key question to ask is one inherited 
from Platonism. Put in the broadest terms, we are dealing here with a version of the 
relationship between appearances and reality inherited from Plato, which is replayed in 
different ways especially (but not only) in the thought of authors most indebted to Platonism 
such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. As in the cases of Plato and Kant, we have to ask 
whether Leibniz held a “one-world” or a “two-world” view.54 That is, according to him, are 
physics and metaphysics about the same objects? Or are they about two different classes of 
objects with no known or knowable relation? Are phenomena expressions or manifestations 
of things-in-themselves? 
It seems to me that, for Leibniz, the answer is clearly yes, and that, therefore, he holds 
a one-world (as opposed to a two-world) view. In other words, for Leibniz, the phenomena 
studied by physics (or, for that matter, the sensible, extended bodies studied by biology) 
express what is ultimately real. Physics and metaphysics are about what is, ultimately, the 
same reality. They offer, however, two different kinds of explanation of what are – really -- 
the same objects. These different kinds of explanation are driven by different sets of issues, 
serve different purposes and, at least to some significant extent, ask different sets of 
questions. Physics aims at describing and explaining the “manifest” world -- that is to say, the 
world of phenomena, the world as it appears to us -- in a mathematical and mechanical way, 
                                                 
53 See for instance Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703 (LDV 262-263; trans. slightly modified): “derivative 
forces are nothing but modifications and results [modificationes et resultationes] of primitive forces.” 
54 Cf. Adams, “Science, Metaphysics, and Reality,” to which I am indebted for this section of the paper. 
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with the ultimate purpose of predicting and mastering these phenomena for the benefit of 
humankind.55 Metaphysics focuses on explaining the world not as it is manifest in experience 
but as it really is. Indeed, according to a recognisable Platonic mould,56 the primitive and 
properly “real” entities are non-sensible entities (immaterial, non-extended, “noumenal” 
entities to borrow a Kantian term) which need to be postulated (as opposed to observed) in 
order to account, ultimately, for the phenomena of which we have sense-experience.57 It is 
clear that, for Leibniz, one inquiry is more fundamental than the other, in the sense that 
metaphysics provides the ultimate grounding of the entities and principles studied by physics. 
Therefore, metaphysics offers a deeper level of explanation insofar as, for Leibniz, it is 
metaphysics rather than physics which offers an account of what is ultimately real, and of 
which physical objects are phenomenal manifestations. 
The latter point holds, I think, irrespective of whether Leibniz thought of what is 
ultimately real in terms of mind-like simple substances or of composite corporeal substances 
constituted by quasi-Aristotelian matter and form.58 Generally put, one could agree with this 
way of conceiving the relationship between physics and metaphysics without needing to buy 
into the full package of an idealist metaphysics.  
In sum, to use Robert M. Adams’s phrase, in my view, there is for Leibniz a trans-
identity between the manifest image of the world, the scientific image of the world, and the 
metaphysical image of the world:59 they are different ways of having a grip on what is, 
                                                 
55 I note that the relationship between physics and the “manifest” world has become more complex since the 
advent of subatomic physics, relativity theory, and quantum theory. These physical theories no longer describe 
the behaviour etc. of entities roughly similar to the objects of our sense experience the way classic Newtonian 
physics did. 
56 See the explicit reference to Plato in the letter to Rémond of January 1714 (GP III, 606) quoted above. 
57 See Specimen Demonstrationum Catholicarum, 1685 (A VI, 4, 2326): “the laws of mechanics themselves do 
not flow from geometrical but from metaphysical principles, and if all things were not governed by a mind, they 
would be very different from what we experience.” 
58 Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, defends the view that in his middle years (roughly from the later 
1670s to the mid-late 1690s) Leibniz had not yet come upon the monadological metaphysics that will 
characterize his later years. “Instead, what one finds there is a metaphysics grounded in corporeal substances, 
extended unities of matter and form.” Moreover, according to Garber, Leibniz’s last (unresolved) problem in his 
final years is how to put these two metaphysical models together, that is, “how to understand the relations 
between the bodies that we experience and the monads that are, in some sense, their metaphysical foundation.” 
(pp. xix, xxi). 
59 See Adams, “Science, Metaphysics, and Reality.” 
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ultimately, the same reality of which metaphysics offers the deepest account. They remain, 
however, different images, with different purposes and different uses. The “metaphysical 
image” may well be the closest to reality for Leibniz, but it is also the most abstract and 
general, and not nearly as useful as the “scientific image” in mastering nature to the benefit of 
humankind – the latter (broadly practical) aim being what drives much of Leibniz’s 
overarching intellectual programme.  
 
A comparison with Galileo, Newton, and Descartes 
 
It may be helpful to compare, at this point, Leibniz’s position with that of other early modern 
giants, namely Galileo, Newton, and Descartes. Galileo and Newton have a different 
approach. What they are after is the explanation of certain natural phenomena in 
mathematical terms. In pursuing this project, they simply decline to do metaphysics, or to 
worry about providing metaphysical roots.60 They recognize that their new science of nature, 
or (as they still call it) their new “natural philosophy”, should take into account only those 
aspects (“affezioni”) of bodies which are perfectly intelligible insofar as they can be 
quantified and, therefore, translated in mathematical terms. On the contrary, as Galileo writes 
in his third letter to Mark Welser on sunspots, it is pointless “tentar l’essenza”, that is, 
speculate about essences of which we have no “intrinsic” knowledge (“notizia intrinseca”).61 
Similarly, with his famous Hypotheses non fingo, Newton declares that metaphysical 
                                                 
60 Descartes even complains about this, pointing at what he regards as the limitation of Galileo’s approach. See 
letter to Marin Mersenne, 11 October 1638; AT II, p. 380. 
61 In Galileo, Istoria e Dimostrazioni intorno alle Macchie Solari. However, it should be noted that, in other 
works, Galileo seems to make ontological or metaphysical claims about the real existence or non-existence of 
qualities in bodies beside those which can be treated in mathematical terms, instead of simply declining to take 
into account in his mathematical explanation of natural phenomena certain features of bodies which are not 
quantifiable. Regarding the issue of Galileo’s metaphysical commitments, some commentators read him as 
holding a Platonic mathematical ontology (cf. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, pp. 74-
83; Koyré, Études Galiléennes) which would provide a metaphysical justification for the application of 
mathematics to physics. Other scholars argue for a non-metaphysical reading of Galileo, noting that his 
“distinctive philosophical contribution to the rise of the new science was to show how one can seek to establish 
the appropriateness of one type of approach to natural science over its competitors without first establishing a 
metaphysical framework as foundation and support.” (Hatfield, “Metaphysics and the New Science,” p. 118). 
See also Vanni Rovighi, Storia della Filosofia Moderna, pp. 31-63 and Drake, Galileo at Work: His Scientific 
Biography. 
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hypotheses “have no place in experimental philosophy” in which “particular propositions are 
inferred from the phenomena”.62 
On the other hand, Descartes and Leibniz are both heirs of the Aristotelian tradition in 
their looking for a grounding of physics in metaphysics, as graphically represented in 
Descartes’s beautiful image of the tree of knowledge.63 Leibniz disagrees with Descartes that 
a mechanical physics cannot grow on Aristotelian metaphysical roots, or at least preserve 
some key Aristotelian metaphysical intuitions, but he fundamentally agrees with Descartes on 
the need for metaphysical roots of physics.64 In my view, for present purposes, the crucial 
difference between them is the following. 
For Descartes, the bodies studied by physics just are the (extended) substances of his 
metaphysics. Hence the lack, in Descartes, of a proper distinction between a physical and a 
metaphysical enquiry about natural bodies. Physics gets to the bottom of their essence since 
this essence reduces to the mathematizible and quantifiable property – extension – which is 
the object of physics. Notwithstanding the fact that Descartes grounds the laws of motion on 
                                                 
62 “General Scholium” of Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, third edition (trans. by 
Cohen and Whitman, p. 943): “I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity 
from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be 
called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred 
from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.” 
63 AT IXB, 14 / CSM I, 186. 
64 Garber, Body, Substance, Monad, p. 179 notes that in his project of grounding physics in metaphysics 
“Descartes is working in a broadly Aristotelian tradition of natural philosophy” while the Galilean project 
represented a “different strand”: “Galileo’s project was within the domain of mixed mathematics, as it was 
called, a quantitative account of the world that favoured mathematical description over an account of the 
ultimate first causes.” Garber concludes with the association of Leibniz with Descartes, and of Newton with 
Galileo. A comparison of Newton and Descartes’s conceptions of the complex relationship between physics and 
metaphysics is offered by Janiak, “Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy in Descartes and Newton.” In his 
forthcoming “Philosophy and Metaphysics in the General Scholium,” Janiak notes that Newton developed his 
philosophical ideas in an ad hoc manner, without articulating any hierarchy of commitments. Perl, “Physics and 
Metaphysics in Newton, Leibniz and Clarke,” concludes that Leibniz and Newton “were doing different things”: 
for Leibniz, metaphysics “enables us to account for those features of experience which are not accessible to the 
restricted methods of science”; for Newton, “such a metaphysical account is superfluous” since “what is not 
properly accounted for in natural philosophy is readily accounted for by God” (p. 526). For a comparison 
between Galileo and Descartes, stressing the non-metaphysical approach of Galileo versus Descartes’s concern 
with the metaphysical grounding of physics, see Dutton, “Physics and Metaphysics in Descartes and Galileo.” 
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theological considerations such as God’s immutability, there is no deeper level of the nature 
of bodies which physics cannot reach, or which is not its proper object of study. The very 
claim that the essence of bodies is extension, however, is a metaphysical rather than a 
physical claim. Descartes’s physics can, therefore, be aptly characterized as a “metaphysical 
physics” (to borrow the title of Garber’s classic book).65 To have a physics which does not 
include such metaphysical claims about what properties of bodies really exit or don’t exist, 
one has to look at Galileo rather than Descartes. It seems to me that, in Descartes, the only 
properly and irreducibly metaphysical inquiry therefore has spiritual substances or minds as 
its object. If there is any distinction between physics and metaphysics in Descartes, this is a 
distinction between a science which studies the corporeal world, adequately grasping its 
essence or nature, and a science which studies the spiritual world. 
For Leibniz, physics proper studies phenomena, that is, the world as it appears to us. 
Although phenomena are manifestations of substances, substances are not its proper object.66 
Although only a metaphysical level of explanation gives us a proper understanding of the 
fundamental principles governing the physical world, these principles belong to a type of 
inquiry which is distinct from physical investigations. In order to achieve its purposes -- that 
is, providing mathematical and mechanical descriptions and explanations of phenomena to 
master nature via our predictions, technical applications, and so on -- physics should not, and 
need not rely on metaphysical entities such as substantial forms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Here Leibniz is, once again, heir of the past and herald of the future. He is the heir of the 
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance tradition endorsing the unity of scientia or knowledge 
and its systematicity. This is a conception which is also a project – the project of the scientia 
generalis and the demonstrative encyclopaedia. This project finds its expression also in his 
one-world view about the need for a metaphysical grounding of physics. Consistent with his 
views on the unity of knowledge and his overarching encyclopaedic vision, Leibniz sees the 
enterprises of metaphysics, on the one hand, and of the new, mathematical and quantitative 
                                                 
65 Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics. 
66 Indeed the claim that phenomena are manifestations of substances and their principles is itself a metaphysical 
rather than a physical claim; it is an example of how metaphysics provides the grounding of physics but is a 
different enterprise. 
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physics, on the other hand, as complementary insofar as they present different accounts of 
what is, ultimately, the same reality. 
Leibniz is, at the same time, herald of the future through one of the first theorized 
distinctions, in the early modern period, between philosophy and “science” (that is, in this 
case, the nascent quantitative physics or classical mechanics) as two different, autonomous 
enterprises. “Autonomy” is to be taken here in its literal sense of having each its own nómos. 
Although linked through a grounding relation, and therefore elements of a systematic vision 
of the unity of knowledge, metaphysics and physics are two different kinds of explanation. 
Physics need not and should not rely on metaphysical entities such as substantial forms, and 
must account for natural phenomena in a rigorously mechanical and mathematical way. On 
the other hand, although Leibniz is undoubtedly one of the strongest advocates of the new 
mathematical and quantitative “science”, he is very far from thinking that any real use for 
philosophy will eventually be restricted to a reflection on the aims and methods of science (in 
its modern meaning). The ultimate level of explanation will remain for him irreducibly 
metaphysical and therefore philosophical. 
This stance paves the way to the modern conception of natural science in a manner 
which is different (but, arguably, philosophically richer) than that of other great architects of 
modern science such as Descartes, Galileo, and Newton. Although there is a sense in which 
“what Leibniz is doing is a kind of enterprise that we don’t do today, either in physics or in 
philosophy,”67 this is because he was laying the foundations of what did not yet exist in his 
time, that is, our distinction between science and philosophy, rather than because he was 
stuck in an obsolete version of natural philosophy. 
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